

Proving termination using dependent types: the case of xor-terms

J.-F. Monin J. Courant

VERIMAG
Grenoble, France

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Outline

Motivation

The case of cryptographic systems

State of the art

Back to cryptographic systems

Solving strategies

Solution (intuitive)

Basic idea

Analyse of \mathcal{T}

Decomposing \mathcal{T}

Stratifying and normalizing a term

Issues

Lifting

Alternation

Forbid fake inclusions

Fixpoints

Conversion rule

Conclusion

Formal models of cryptographic systems

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- ▶ Protocols
- ▶ Security APIs

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Xor is ubiquitous

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Examples from a security API called CCA
(Common Cryptographic Architecture):

$$x, y, \{z\}_{x \oplus KP \oplus KM} \mapsto \{z \oplus y\}_{x \oplus KP \oplus KM}$$

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Reasoning involves:

Commutativity: $x \oplus y \simeq y \oplus x$

Associativity: $(x \oplus y) \oplus z \simeq x \oplus (y \oplus z)$

Neutral element: $x \oplus 0 \simeq x$

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General setting: quotiented first order-terms

We are given

- ▶ A type of terms \mathcal{T} with constructors C_k :

Inductive \mathcal{T} : $\text{Set} :=$

| $C_1 : \mathcal{T}$

⋮

| $C_k : \dots \rightarrow \mathcal{T} \dots \rightarrow \mathcal{T} \dots \rightarrow \mathcal{T}$

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- ▶ A congruence $\simeq : \mathcal{T} \rightarrow \mathcal{T} \rightarrow \text{Prop}$

- ▶ For each constructor C_k

$\forall a, \dots x_1, y_1, b, \dots x_2, y_2, \dots c,$

$x_1 \simeq y_1 \rightarrow x_2 \simeq y_2 \rightarrow$

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We want to reason on \mathcal{T} up to \simeq

Already well-known examples

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- ▶ finite bags represented by finite lists
- ▶ algebra of formal arithmetic expressions
 - + is associative, commutative, 0 is neutral
 - × is associative, commutative, 1 is neutral
 - × distributes over +
- ▶ (mobile) process calculi, chemical abstract machines
 - parallel composition and choice operators are AC

Quotients in type theory

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- ▶ Explicit approach :
 - ▶ Define a normalization function N on \mathcal{T}
 - ▶ Compare terms using syntactic equality on their norms :
 $x \simeq y$ iff $Nx = Ny$

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Cryptographic systems need more

Reasoning on such systems involves

- ▶ comparing terms up to AC + involutivity of \oplus :

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→ normalization is needed!

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- ▶ AC matching: a non trivial matter

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 \mathcal{T}' enriched version of \mathcal{T} ,
trivial forgetful morphism $\mathcal{T}' \rightarrow \mathcal{T}$.

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Interesting part = $\mathcal{T} \rightarrow \mathcal{T}'$

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- ▶ in our case: need 2 layers, pasta and sauce
- ▶ normalizing pasta = identity
- ▶ normalizing sauce = rearranging + removing duplicates

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\mathcal{T} as a lasagna

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Inductive \mathcal{T} : Set :=

| Zero: \mathcal{T}

| PC: *public_const* $\rightarrow \mathcal{T}$ | SC: *secret_const* $\rightarrow \mathcal{T}$

| E: $\mathcal{T} \rightarrow \mathcal{T} \rightarrow \mathcal{T}$

| Xor: $\mathcal{T} \rightarrow \mathcal{T} \rightarrow \mathcal{T}$

| Hash: $\mathcal{T} \rightarrow \mathcal{T} \rightarrow \mathcal{T}$.

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
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
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Inductive \mathcal{T}_x : Set :=

| *X_Zero* : \mathcal{T}_x

| *X_Xor* : $\mathcal{T}_x \rightarrow \mathcal{T}_x \rightarrow \mathcal{T}_x$

Inductive \mathcal{T}_n : Set :=

| *NX_PC* : *public_const* $\rightarrow \mathcal{T}_n$

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Variable A : Set.

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- | X_ns : $A \rightarrow \mathcal{T}_x$

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- | NX_sum : $A \rightarrow \mathcal{T}_n$

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
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- ▶ What is k ?
- ▶ The number of layers on the left subterm and on the right subterm are different in general.

Take the max

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 - ▶ $\text{lift}_x : \mathcal{L}_x k \rightarrow \mathcal{L}_x(k + d)$, $\text{lift}_n : \mathcal{L}_n k \rightarrow \mathcal{L}_n(k + d)$

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 - ▶ $\text{lift}_x : \mathcal{L}_x k \rightarrow \mathcal{L}_x(k + d)$, $\text{lift}_n : \mathcal{L}_n k \rightarrow \mathcal{L}_n(k + d)$
 - ▶ No need to prove that **max** is the max.

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Solution (intuitive)

Basic idea

Analyse of \mathcal{T}

Decomposing \mathcal{T}

Stratifying and normalizing a term

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Alternation

Forbid fake inclusions

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Control them using **alternating natural numbers**

Inductive $alt_{even}: Set :=$

| $0_e: alt_{even}$

| $S_{o \rightarrow e}: alt_{odd} \rightarrow alt_{even}$

with $alt_{odd}: Set :=$

| $S_{e \rightarrow o}: alt_{even} \rightarrow alt_{odd}$

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Inductive \mathcal{T}_x : Set :=

- | X_Zero : \mathcal{T}_x
- | X_ns : $A \rightarrow \mathcal{T}_x$
- | X_Xor : $\mathcal{T}_x \rightarrow \mathcal{T}_x \rightarrow \mathcal{T}_x$

Inductive \mathcal{T}_n : Set :=

- | NX_PC : *public_const* $\rightarrow \mathcal{T}_n$
- | NX_SC : *secret_const* $\rightarrow \mathcal{T}_n$
- | NX_sum : $A \rightarrow \mathcal{T}_n$
- | NX_E : $\mathcal{T}_n \rightarrow \mathcal{T}_n \rightarrow \mathcal{T}_n$
- | NX_Hash : $\mathcal{T}_n \rightarrow \mathcal{T}_n \rightarrow \mathcal{T}_n$

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$X_ns (NX_sum (X_ns (NX_sum (...))))$

Forbid fake inclusions

Inductive \mathcal{T}_x : $bool \rightarrow Set :=$

| $X_Zero : \forall b, \mathcal{T}_x b$

| $X_ns : \forall b, ls_true b \rightarrow A \rightarrow \mathcal{T}_x b$

| $X_Xor : \forall b, \mathcal{T}_x true \rightarrow \mathcal{T}_x true \rightarrow \mathcal{T}_x b$

Inductive \mathcal{T}_n : $bool \rightarrow Set :=$

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Many 10 lines definitions, almost no theorem

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Fixpoint $lift_lasagna_x\ e_1\ e_2\ \{struct\ e_1\}$:

```
 $\mathcal{L}_x\ e_1 \rightarrow \mathcal{L}_x\ (e_1 + e_2) :=$   
match  $e_1$  return  $\mathcal{L}_x\ e_1 \rightarrow \mathcal{L}_x\ (e_1 + e_2)$  with  
|  $O_e \Rightarrow \text{fun } emp \Rightarrow \text{match } emp \text{ with end}$   
|  $S_{o \rightarrow e}\ o_1 \Rightarrow \text{map}_x\ (lift\_lasagna\_n\ o_1\ e_2)\ \text{false}$   
end
```

with $lift_lasagna_n\ o_1\ e_2\ \{struct\ o_1\}$:

```
 $\mathcal{L}_n\ o_1 \rightarrow \mathcal{L}_n\ (o_1 + e_2) :=$   
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|  $S_{e \rightarrow o}\ e_1 \Rightarrow \text{map}_n\ (lift\_lasagna\_x\ e_1\ e_2)\ \text{false}$   
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Used everywhere

Conversion rule

Used everywhere

Definition *bin_xor*

$(bin : \forall A b, \mathcal{T}_x A \text{ true} \rightarrow \mathcal{T}_x A \text{ true} \rightarrow \mathcal{T}_x A b) o_1 o_2 b$

$(l_1 : \text{lasagna_cand_x } o_1 \text{ true})$

$(l_2 : \text{lasagna_cand_x } o_2 \text{ true}) :$

$\text{lasagna_cand_x } (\text{max_oo } o_1 o_2) b :=$

$bin (\mathcal{L}_n (\text{max_oo } o_1 o_2)) b$

$(\text{lift_lasagna_cand_x true } o_1 (o_2 - o_1) l_1)$

$(\text{coerce_max_comm}$

$(\text{lift_lasagna_cand_x true } o_2 (o_1 - o_2) l_2)).$

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- ▶ Mutually inductive types

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