

A computational proof of dependent choice, compatible with classical logic

(partially work in progress)

Hugo Herbelin

Réalisabilité à Chambéry #5

8 June 2012

Outline

- Thanks to strong sums, Martin-Löf's intuitionistic type theory proves the axiom of choice
- Strong sums do not marry well with computational classical logic
- Countable universal quantification can be turned into infinite conjunction in PA^ω that can be evaluated lazily
- Restricting proofs of strong sums to “negative-elimination free” proofs allows to ensure these proofs to be essentially intuitionistic while keeping the rest of the logic compatible with classical reasoning
- Countable choice and dependent choice are *intuitionistically* provable in PA^ω + negative-elimination-free strong sums
- Comparison with realisability-based approaches (Krivine, Berardi-Bezem-Coquand, Escardó-Oliva)

The axiom of choice in Martin-Löf's intuitionistic type theory

Using strong sums (a.k.a. strong existential, or Σ -types)

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash p : \exists x^T A(x)}{\Gamma \vdash \text{prf } p : A(\text{wit } p)}$$

the (intensional) axiom of choice is provable in Martin-Löf's intuitionistic type theory:

$$\begin{aligned} AC_{A,B} &\triangleq \lambda H. (\lambda x. \text{wit } (H x), \lambda x. \text{prf } (H x)) \\ &: \forall x^A \exists y^B P(x, y) \Rightarrow \exists f^{A \Rightarrow B} \forall x^A P(x, f(x)) \end{aligned}$$

Strong sums are incompatible with classical logic

Consider computational classical logic:

$$\frac{\Gamma, \alpha : A^\perp \vdash p : A}{\Gamma \vdash \text{catch}_\alpha p : A} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash p : A \quad (\alpha : A^\perp) \in \Gamma}{\Gamma \vdash \text{throw}_\alpha p : C}$$

Example, Drinker Paradox:

$$DP \triangleq \text{catch}_\alpha.(x_0, \lambda y. \lambda H_x. \text{catch}_\beta \text{throw}_\alpha(y, \lambda y'. \lambda H_y. \text{throw}_\beta H_y))$$
$$: \exists x \forall y (P(x) \Rightarrow P(y))$$

Strong sums are incompatible with classical logic

What is `wit` on a proof that might backtrack on the witnesses it provides?

Indeed, applied to `prf`, the standard rule for computational classical logic gives:

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{prf} (\text{callcc}_\alpha (t_1, \dots (\text{throw}_\alpha (t_2, p)) \dots)) \\ & \rightarrow \text{callcc}_\alpha \text{prf} (t_1, \dots (\text{throw}_\alpha \text{prf} (t_2, p)) \dots) \end{aligned}$$

and the right-hand side is not typable because the two occurrences of α get the a priori incompatible types $P(t_1)$ and $P(t_2)$

In particular, in the proof of choice,

$$\begin{aligned} AC_{A,B} & \triangleq \lambda H. (\lambda x. \text{wit} (H x), \lambda x. \text{prf} (H x)) \\ & : \quad \forall x^A \exists y^B P(x, y) \Rightarrow \exists f^{A \Rightarrow B} \forall x^A P(x, f(x)) \end{aligned}$$

if $Hx : \exists y P(x, y)$ is classically proved then what `wit` ($H x$) should be is unclear, and how to keep it “synchronised” with `prf` ($H x$) is even more unclear.

A trick to recover *countable* choice

Turn $\forall x \exists y P(x, y)$ into a infinite conjunction $\exists y P(0, y) \wedge \exists y P(1, y) \wedge \dots$ and prove instead

$$\begin{aligned} AC'_{\mathbb{N}, B} &\triangleq \lambda H. (\lambda n. \text{wit } (\text{nth } n H), \lambda n. \text{prf } (\text{nth } n H)) \\ &: (\exists y P(0, y) \wedge \exists y P(1, y) \wedge \dots) \Rightarrow \exists f^{A \Rightarrow B} \forall x^A P(x, f(x)) \end{aligned}$$

Now, the infinite conjunction is a “positive” object and we just have to evaluate it in (lazy) call-by-value order to ensure that at the time `wit` and `prf` are called, the underlying stream is evaluated at this position.

Classical arithmetic in finite types: PA^ω

(the language of expressions: system T)

$$T, U ::= \mathbb{N} \mid T \Rightarrow U$$

$$t, u ::= x \mid 0 \mid S(t) \mid \text{rec } t \text{ of } [t \mid (x, y).t] \mid \lambda x.t \mid t t$$

$$\frac{(x : T) \in \Gamma}{\Gamma \vdash x : T} \quad \frac{\Gamma, x : U \vdash t : T}{\Gamma \vdash \lambda x.t : U \Rightarrow T} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash t : U \Rightarrow T \quad \Gamma \vdash u : U}{\Gamma \vdash t u : T}$$

$$\frac{}{\Gamma \vdash 0 : \mathbb{N}} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash t : \mathbb{N}}{\Gamma \vdash S(t) : \mathbb{N}} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash t : \mathbb{N} \quad \Gamma \vdash t_0 : U \quad \Gamma, x : \mathbb{N}, y : U \vdash t_S : U}{\Gamma \vdash \text{rec } t \text{ of } [t_0 \mid (x, y).t_S] : U}$$

$$(\lambda x.t) u \equiv t[x \leftarrow u]$$

$$\text{rec } 0 \text{ of } [t_0 \mid (x, y).t_S] \equiv t_0$$

$$\text{rec } S(t) \text{ of } [t_0 \mid (x, y).t_S] \equiv t_S[x \leftarrow t][y \leftarrow \text{rec } t \text{ of } [t_0 \mid (x, y).t_S]]$$

Classical arithmetic in finite types: PA^ω
(formulas and equational theory)

$A, B ::= t = u \mid \top \mid \perp \mid A \Rightarrow B \mid A \wedge B \mid A \vee B \mid \forall x^T A \mid \exists x^T A$

$$\begin{aligned} 0 = 0 &\equiv \top \\ 0 = S(u) &\equiv \perp \\ S(t) = 0 &\equiv \perp \\ S(t) = S(u) &\equiv t = u \end{aligned}$$

Classical arithmetic in finite types: PA^ω

(intuitionistic inference rules)

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \frac{(a : A) \in \Gamma}{\Gamma \vdash a : A} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash p : A \quad \Gamma, a : A \vdash q : B}{\Gamma \vdash \text{let } a = p \text{ in } q : B} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash p : A \quad A \equiv B}{\Gamma \vdash p : B} \quad \frac{}{\Gamma \vdash () : \top} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash p : \perp}{\Gamma \vdash \text{exfalse } p : C} \\
 \\
 \frac{\Gamma \vdash p_1 : A_1 \quad \Gamma \vdash p_2 : A_2}{\Gamma \vdash (p_1, p_2) : A_1 \wedge A_2} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash p : A_1 \wedge A_2 \quad \Gamma, a_1 : A_1, a_2 : A_2 \vdash q : B}{\Gamma \vdash \text{split } p \text{ as } (a_1, a_2) \text{ in } q : B} \\
 \\
 \frac{\Gamma \vdash p : A_i}{\Gamma \vdash \iota_i(p) : A_1 \vee A_2} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash p : A_1 \vee A_2 \quad \Gamma, a_1 : A_1 \vdash p_1 : B \quad \Gamma, a_2 : A_2 \vdash p_2 : B}{\Gamma \vdash \text{case } p \text{ of } [a_1.p_1 \mid a_2.p_2] : B} \\
 \\
 \frac{\Gamma, a : A \vdash p : B}{\Gamma \vdash \lambda a.p : A \Rightarrow B} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash p : A \Rightarrow B \quad \Gamma \vdash q : A}{\Gamma \vdash pq : B} \quad \frac{\Gamma, x : T \vdash p : A(x)}{\Gamma \vdash \lambda x.p : \forall x^T A(x)} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash p : \forall x^T A(x) \quad \Gamma \vdash t : T}{\Gamma \vdash pt : A(t)} \\
 \\
 \frac{\Gamma \vdash p : A(t) \quad \Gamma \vdash t : T}{\Gamma \vdash (t, p) : \exists x^T A(x)} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash p : \exists x^T A(x) \quad \Gamma, x : T, a : A(x) \vdash q : B}{\Gamma \vdash \text{dest } p \text{ as } (x, a) \text{ in } q : B} \\
 \\
 \frac{t \equiv u}{\Gamma \vdash \text{refl } : t = u} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash p : t = u \quad \Gamma \vdash q : P(t)}{\Gamma \vdash \text{subst } pq : P(u)} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash t : \mathbb{N} \quad \Gamma \vdash p : P(0) \quad \Gamma, x : T, a : P(x) \vdash q : P(S(x))}{\Gamma \vdash \text{ind } t \text{ of } [p \mid (x, a).q] : P(t)}
 \end{array}$$

Classical arithmetic in finite types: PA^ω
(classical logic)

$$\frac{\Gamma, \alpha : A^\perp \vdash p : A}{\Gamma \vdash \text{catch}_\alpha p : A} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash p : A \quad (\alpha : A^\perp) \in \Gamma}{\Gamma \vdash \text{throw}_\alpha p : C}$$

Classical arithmetic in finite types: PA^ω

(call-by-value evaluation semantics, minimal part)

$(\lambda a.q) p$	$\rightarrow \text{let } a = p \text{ in } q$
$(\lambda x.p) t$	$\rightarrow p[x \leftarrow t]$
$\text{case } \iota_i(p) \text{ of } [a_1.p_1 \mid a_2.p_2]$	$\rightarrow \text{let } a_i = p \text{ in } p_i$
$\text{dest } (t, p) \text{ as } (x, a) \text{ in } q$	$\rightarrow \text{let } a = p \text{ in } q[x \leftarrow t]$
$\text{split } (p_1, p_2) \text{ as } (a_1, a_2) \text{ in } q$	$\rightarrow \text{let } a_1 = p_1 \text{ in let } a_2 = p_2 \text{ in } q$
$\text{let } a = b \text{ in } q$	$\rightarrow q[a \leftarrow b]$
$\text{let } a = \lambda b.q \text{ in } q$	$\rightarrow q[a \leftarrow \lambda b.q]$
$\text{let } a = \lambda x.p \text{ in } q$	$\rightarrow q[a \leftarrow \lambda x.t]$
$\text{let } a = () \text{ in } q$	$\rightarrow q[a \leftarrow ()]$
$\text{let } a = \iota_i(p) \text{ in } q$	$\rightarrow \text{let } b = p \text{ in } q[a \leftarrow \iota_i(b)]$
$\text{let } a = (t, p) \text{ in } q$	$\rightarrow \text{let } b = p \text{ in } q[a \leftarrow (t, b)]$
$\text{let } a = (p_1, p_2) \text{ in } q$	$\rightarrow \text{let } a_1 = p_1 \text{ in let } a_2 = p_2 \text{ in } q[a \leftarrow (a_1, a_2)]$
$\text{subst refl } p$	$\rightarrow p$
$\text{ind } 0 \text{ of } [p \mid (x, a).q]$	$\rightarrow p$
$\text{ind } S(t) \text{ of } [p \mid (x, a).q]$	$\rightarrow q[x \leftarrow t][a \leftarrow \text{ind } t \text{ of } [p \mid (x, a).q]]$

Classical arithmetic in finite types: PA^ω

(call-by-value evaluation semantics, non minimal part)

$$\begin{aligned}
 F[\text{exfalse } p] &\rightarrow \text{exfalse } p \\
 F[\text{throw}_\alpha p] &\rightarrow \text{throw}_\alpha p \\
 F[\text{catch}_\alpha p] &\rightarrow \text{catch}_\alpha F[p[\alpha \leftarrow F]] \\
 \text{exfalse exfalse } p &\rightarrow \text{exfalse } p \\
 \text{exfalse throw}_\beta p &\rightarrow \text{throw}_\beta p \\
 \text{exfalse catch}_\beta p &\rightarrow \text{exfalse } p[\alpha \leftarrow \text{exfalse } []] \\
 \text{throw}_\beta \text{exfalse } p &\rightarrow \text{exfalse } p \\
 \text{throw}_\beta \text{throw}_\alpha p &\rightarrow \text{throw}_\alpha p \\
 \text{throw}_\beta \text{catch}_\alpha p &\rightarrow \text{throw}_\beta p[\alpha \leftarrow \beta] \\
 \text{catch}_\alpha \text{throw}_\alpha p &\rightarrow \text{catch}_\alpha p \\
 \text{catch}_\beta \text{catch}_\alpha p &\rightarrow \text{catch}_\beta p[\alpha \leftarrow \beta]
 \end{aligned}$$

where

$$\begin{aligned}
 F[] &::= \iota_i([]) \mid ([], p) \mid (V, []) \mid (t, []) \\
 &\mid \text{case } [] \text{ of } [a_1.p_1 \mid a_2.p_2] \mid \text{split } [] \text{ as } (a_1, a_2) \text{ in } q \mid \text{subst } [] p \\
 &\mid \text{dest } [] \text{ as } (x, a) \text{ in } p \mid [] q \mid [] t \mid \text{let } a = [] \text{ in } q
 \end{aligned}$$

Note: can be reduced to 2 rules if one decomposes $\text{catch}_\alpha p$, $\text{throw}_\alpha p$ and $\text{exfalse } p$ as $\mu\alpha.[\alpha]p$, $\mu_.[\alpha]p$ and $\mu_.[\mathbf{tp}_\perp]p$ respectively (for \mathbf{tp}_\perp evaluation context constant witnessing \perp -elimination).

PA^ω has coinductive formulas

For instance, the infinite conjunction $P(0) \wedge P(1) \wedge \dots$ can be represented by

$$\exists f^{\mathbb{N} \Rightarrow \mathbb{N}} (f(0) = 1 \wedge \forall n (f(n) = 1 \Rightarrow (P(n) \wedge f(S(n)) = 1)))$$

(standard second order encoding, using quantification over functions rather than on predicates)

For convenience, add primitive cofixpoints to PA^ω

$$\frac{\Gamma, f : T \Rightarrow \mathbb{N}, x : T, b : f(x) = 1 \vdash p : A \quad f(_) = 1 \text{ possibly occurs in positive } A}{\Gamma \vdash \text{cofix}_{bx}^t p : \nu_{fx}^t A}$$

with equation

$$\nu_{fx}^t A \equiv A[x \leftarrow t][f(y) = 1 \leftarrow \nu_{fx}^y A]$$

For instance, $\nu_{fx}^3 (P(x) \wedge f(S(x)) = 1)$ represents $P(3) \wedge P(4) \wedge \dots$

Extend evaluation semantics of PA^ω to cofixpoints

case $\text{cofix}_{bx}^t p$ of $[a_1.p_1 \mid a_2.p_2]$	\rightarrow let $c = \text{cofix}_{bx}^t p$ in case c of $[a_1.p_1 \mid a_2.p_2]$
dest $\text{cofix}_{bx}^t p$ as (x, a) in q	\rightarrow let $c = \text{cofix}_{bx}^t p$ in dest c as (x, a) in q
split $\text{cofix}_{bx}^t p$ as (a_1, a_2) in q	\rightarrow let $c = \text{cofix}_{bx}^t p$ in split c as (a_1, a_2) in q
let $a = \text{cofix}_{bx}^t p$ in $\text{exfalse } q$	\rightarrow exfalse let $a = \text{cofix}_{bx}^t p$ in q
let $a = \text{cofix}_{bx}^t p$ in $\text{throw}_\alpha q$	\rightarrow throw_α let $a = \text{cofix}_{bx}^t p$ in q
let $a = \text{cofix}_{bx}^t p$ in $\text{catch}_\alpha q$	\rightarrow catch_α let $a = \text{cofix}_{bx}^t p$ in q
$F[\text{let } a = \text{cofix}_{bx}^t p \text{ in } q]$	\rightarrow let $a = \text{cofix}_{bx}^t p$ in $F[q]$
let $a = \text{cofix}_{bx}^t p$ in $D[\text{case } a \text{ of } [a_1.p_1 \mid a_2.p_2]]$	\rightarrow let $a = p[b \leftarrow \lambda y. \text{cofix}_{bx}^y p][x \leftarrow t]$ in $D[\text{case } a \text{ of } [a_1.p_1 \mid a_2.p_2]]$
let $a = \text{cofix}_{bx}^t p$ in $D[\text{split } a \text{ as } (a_1, a_2) \text{ in } q]$	\rightarrow let $a = p[b \leftarrow \lambda y. \text{cofix}_{bx}^y p][x \leftarrow t]$ in $D[\text{split } a \text{ as } (a_1, a_2) \text{ in } q]$
let $a = \text{cofix}_{bx}^t p$ in $D[\text{dest } a \text{ as } (x, a') \text{ in } q]$	\rightarrow let $a = p[b \leftarrow \lambda y. \text{cofix}_{bx}^y p][x \leftarrow t]$ in $D[\text{dest } a \text{ as } (x, a') \text{ in } q]$

where

$$D[\] ::= [\] \mid D[F[\]] \mid \text{let } a = \text{cofix}_{bx}^t p \text{ in } D[\]$$

Adding strong elimination of existential to PA^ω (first step)

Replace weak elimination of existential by

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash V : \exists x^T A(x)}{\Gamma \vdash \text{prf } V : A(\text{wit } V)} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash V : \exists x^T A(x)}{\Gamma \vdash \text{wit } V : T}$$

where

$$V ::= a \mid \iota_i(V) \mid (V, V) \mid (t, V) \mid \lambda a.p \mid \lambda x.p \mid () \mid \text{refl}$$

Moreover, forbid dependency in implication introduction and cut

$$\frac{\Gamma, a : A \vdash p : B \quad a \notin FV(B)}{\Gamma \vdash \lambda a.p : A \Rightarrow B} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash p : A \quad \Gamma, a : A \vdash q : B \quad a \notin FV(B)}{\Gamma \vdash \text{let } a = p \text{ in } q : B}$$

And update the equational theory, evaluation contexts and evaluation rules

$$\text{wit}(t, p) \equiv t \quad F[] ::= \dots \mid \text{prf} [] \quad \text{prf}(t, p) \rightarrow p$$

Claim: The resulting system is equivalent to PA^ω for judgements not mentioning `wit`: the restriction on p combined with call-by-value ensures that p is “evaluated” when substituted and that no classical reasoning occurs before taking the witness.

Adding strong elimination of existential to PA^ω (second step)

Replace weak elimination of existential by

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash p : \exists x^T A(x) \quad p \text{ is positively eliminated}}{\Gamma \vdash \text{prf } p : A(\text{wit } p)}$$

where

- a value is positively eliminated
- if p , q , p_1 and p_2 are positively eliminated then `case a of [a1.p1 | a2.p2]`, `dest q as (x, a) in p` and `split q as (a1, a2) in p` are positively eliminated

Claim: we still get a system equivalent to PA^ω .

Adding strong elimination of existential to PA^ω (third step)

Replace weak elimination of existential by

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash p : \exists x^T A(x) \quad p \text{ is strongly N-elimination-free}}{\Gamma \vdash \text{prf } p : A(\text{wit } p)}$$

where

- a value is strongly N-elimination-free
- if p , q , p_1 and p_2 are strongly N-elimination-free then `ind t of [p1 | (x, a).p2]`, `case a of [a1.p1 | a2.p2]`, `dest q as (x, a) in p` and `split q as (a1, a2) in p` are strongly N-elimination-free

Claim: we then get the strength of countable choice

The proof of countable choice

$$\begin{aligned} AC_{\mathbb{N}} &\triangleq \lambda a. \text{let } b = \text{cofix}_{bn}^0(a \ n, b(Sn)) \text{ in} \\ &\quad (\lambda n. \text{wit}(\text{nth}_C \ n \ b), \lambda n. \text{prf}(\text{nth}_C \ n \ b)) \\ &\quad : \forall n \exists y \ P(n, y) \Rightarrow \exists f \forall n \ P(n, f(n)) \end{aligned}$$

where

$$\text{nth}_C \ n \quad : \quad R_C(0) \Rightarrow R_C(n)$$

$$\text{nth}_C \ n \triangleq \lambda b. \pi_1(\text{ind } n \text{ of } [b \mid (m, c). \pi_2(c)])$$

(s is the stream of type $R_C(0) \triangleq \exists y \ P(0, y) \wedge \exists y \ P(1, y) \wedge \dots$ extracted from the hypothesis)

Adding strong elimination of existential to PA^ω (fourth step)

Replace weak elimination of existential by

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash p : \exists x^T A(x) \quad p \text{ is N-elimination-free}}{\Gamma \vdash \text{prf } p : A(\text{wit } p)}$$

where

- a value is N-elimination-free
- if p , q , p_1 and p_2 is N-elimination-free then $\text{prf } p$, $\text{ind } t$ of $[p_1 \mid (x, a).p_2]$, $\text{case } a$ of $[a_1.p_1 \mid a_2.p_2]$, $\text{dest } q$ as (x, a) in p and $\text{split } q$ as (a_1, a_2) in p are N-elimination-free.

Claim: we then get the strength of dependent choice

The proof of dependent choice

$$\begin{aligned}
 DC &\triangleq \lambda a. \lambda x_0. \text{let } b = \mathbf{s} a x_0 \text{ in} \\
 &\quad (\lambda n. \text{wit} (\text{nth}_D n (x_0, b)), \\
 &\quad (\text{refl}, \lambda n. \pi_1(\text{prf} (\text{prf} (\text{nth}_D n (x_0, b))))) \\
 &: \forall x \exists y P(x, y) \Rightarrow \\
 &\quad \forall x_0 \exists f (f(0) = x_0 \wedge \forall n P(f(n), f(S(n))))
 \end{aligned}$$

where

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{nth}_D n &: \exists x R_D(x) \Rightarrow \exists x R_D(x) \\
 \text{nth}_D n &\triangleq \lambda b. \text{ind } n \text{ of } [b \mid (m, c). \text{dest } c \text{ as } (x, d) \text{ in} \\
 &\quad (\text{wit} (\text{prf } d), \pi_2(\text{prf} (\text{prf } d)))] \\
 \mathbf{s} a x &: R_D(x) \\
 \mathbf{s} a x &\triangleq \text{cofix}_{bn}^x (\text{dest } a n \text{ as } (y, c) \text{ in } (y, (c, by)))
 \end{aligned}$$

(s is a stream of type $R_D(x_0) \triangleq \exists x_1 (P(x_0, x_1) \wedge \exists x_2 (P(x_1, x_2) \wedge \dots))$ obtained by recursively applying the hypothesis)

(that exactly the strength of dependent choice is captured is still a conjecture)

Properties of the systems with N-elimination-free strong elimination of existential quantification

Subject reduction: if $\Gamma \vdash p : A$ and $p \rightarrow q$ then $\Gamma \vdash q : A$

Normalisation: if $\Gamma \vdash p : A$ then p normalises [the proof, which is still in progress, uses dependent choice at the meta-level]

Progress: if $\vdash p : A$ and p not a value then p reduces

Evaluation: $\vdash p : A$ then $\vdash V : A$ for some V s.t. $P \xrightarrow{*} V$

Conservativity over HA^ω for closed \forall - \Rightarrow - ν -wit-free and Σ_1^0 -formulas: if $\vdash T$ and T \forall - \Rightarrow - ν -wit-free or Σ_1^0 then $\vdash_{HA^\omega} T$

Consistency: $\not\vdash \perp$

Comparison with Krivine's realiser of the axioms of countable and dependent choice (restated as a proof in PA_2 + quote)

Krivine's "proof" only supports the existence of *relational* choice functions

It needs classical logic

It relies on a "quote" effect χ typed with

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash p : \exists X P(X)}{\Gamma \vdash \chi p : \exists n P(\Phi_P(n))} \quad \text{where } \Phi_P \text{ is a formal predicate constant}$$

$$\begin{aligned} AC_{\mathbb{N}} &\triangleq \lambda a.(U_P, \\ &\quad \lambda x.\text{dest } \chi(a x) \text{ as } (n, b) \text{ in } \text{catch}_{\alpha} \text{wf}_x (\lambda n'.\lambda f.\lambda b'.\text{throw}_{\alpha}(\uparrow_{P(x,Y)}^{n'fb'} b')) n b) \\ &: \forall x^{\mathbb{N}} \exists Y^{\mathbb{N} \Rightarrow * } P(x, Y) \\ &\Rightarrow \exists U^{\mathbb{N} \Rightarrow \mathbb{N} \Rightarrow * } \forall x^{\mathbb{N}} P(x, U(x)) \end{aligned}$$

where

$$V(x, n) \triangleq \neg P(x, \Phi_P(x, n))$$

$$Z(x, n) \triangleq \forall m < n V(x, m) \Rightarrow V(x, n)$$

$$U_P(x) \triangleq \forall n (\neg Z(x, n) \Rightarrow \Phi_P(x, n)) \quad \text{“exists } n \text{ minimal s.t. } \Phi_P(x, n)\text{”}$$

$$\text{wf}_x \quad : \quad \forall n Z(x, n) \Rightarrow \forall n V(x, n) \quad \text{“if } P(x, \Phi_P(x, n)), \text{ there is a minimal } n \text{ for it”}$$

and for $f : \forall m < n V(x, m)$ and $b : P(x, \Phi_P(x, n))$

$$\uparrow_A^{nfb} \quad : \quad A(\Phi_P(x, n)) \Rightarrow A(U_P(x))$$

$$\uparrow_{Y(t)}^{nfb} c \triangleq \lambda n'. \lambda k. \text{if } n = n' \text{ then } c \text{ else } k \lambda f'. \lambda b'. \text{if } n' < n \text{ then } f n' b' \text{ else } f' n b$$

$$\uparrow_{A \wedge B}^{nfb} c \triangleq (\uparrow_A^{nfb} (\pi_1 c), \uparrow_B^{nfb} (\pi_2 c))$$

$$\uparrow_{A \Rightarrow B}^{nfb} c \triangleq \lambda a. (\uparrow_B^{nfb} (c (\downarrow_A^{nfb} a)))$$

...

$$\downarrow_A^{nfb} \quad : \quad A(U_P(x)) \Rightarrow A(\Phi_P(x, n))$$

$$\downarrow_{Y(t)}^{nfb} c \triangleq c n \lambda k. k f b$$

$$\downarrow_{A \wedge B}^{nfb} c \triangleq (\downarrow_A^{nfb} (\pi_1 c), \downarrow_B^{nfb} (\pi_2 c))$$

$$\downarrow_{A \Rightarrow B}^{nfb} c \triangleq \lambda a. (\downarrow_B^{nfb} (c (\uparrow_A^{nfb} a)))$$

...

How to implement quote

Krivine implements χ by quoting the top argument of the stack at runtime. It seems that an alternative implementation is possible by quoting instead the witness:

$$\begin{aligned}\chi p &\triangleq ([\text{wit } p], \text{prf } p) \\ \Phi(n) &\triangleq [n]\end{aligned}$$

so that the reduction rule is

$$\chi(U, p) \rightarrow ([U], p)$$

Quoting needs its argument closed. The rule can however be used as a local rule: only the decidability of equality $[U] = [U']$ will need U and U' to be closed so as to be evaluable.

Comparison with Coquand-Berardi-Bezem's realiser of the axioms of countable choice

As rephrased by Berger, Coquand-Berardi-Bezem's "proof" builds a choice function by *update* induction.

Initially, the choice function returns a dummy value everywhere.

Each time a proof of $P(n, f(n))$ is requested, the proof of $\exists y P(n, y)$ together with a continuation that updates the choice function.

If, later on, the proof of some $P(n, f(n))$ has already been asked, the former value is retrieved.

In our case, the choice function has no default value. The proofs of $\exists y P(i, y)$ for $i \leq n$ are executed whenever either $f(n)$ or $P(n, f(n))$ is requested (but alternative, more sophisticated, evaluation strategies for PA^ω can be imagined).

Comparison with Escardó-Oliva's realiser of the axiom of countable and dependent choice

Similar idea of evaluating a cofixpoint.

Note: Other realisation exists (e.g. Spector's functional interpretation based on bar recursion).

Summary

By adding an appropriate intuitionistically-restricted rule for strong elimination of existential to PA^ω , we computationally capture the strength of either countable choice or dependent choice.

This can be turned into a Martin-Löf-style type theory by allowing dependent products with the restriction that they are instantiated only by N-elimination-free expressions.

Provides with an intuitionistic proof of bar induction compatible with classical logic:

$$\forall f \exists n B(f|_n) \Rightarrow \forall g \left(\begin{array}{l} \forall l (B(l) \Rightarrow g(l) = 0) \wedge \\ \forall l (\forall x g(l \star x) = 0 \Rightarrow g(l) = 0) \end{array} \right) \Rightarrow g(\langle \rangle) = 0$$

Our proof of choice uses a weak form of effect (lazy evaluation) but we suspect that other proofs using effects are possible...